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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
tors are concerned, but is there
such a principle affecting secured
creditors? Courts of equity have
fashioned a way to carry out the
same theory of equitable distribution with regard to secured creditors' rights, giving due regard for
priorities of liens, under the doctrine of "marshaling of assets."
However, the recent case of In re
Spectra Prism Industries, Inc. 3
casts some doubt as to the application of this equitable doctrine in
bankruptcy to protect a junior secured creditor's rights against infringement by unsecured general
creditors.

MARSHALING OF ASSETS IN
BANKRUPTCY CASES: THE
SPECTER OF CONSTANCE v.
HARVEY 1 APPEARS AGAIN

One of the cardinal objectives
of bankruptcy law is an equitable
distribution of the debtor's property among its creditors. This objective is generally achieved when
the proceeds of the debtor's property are distributed pro rata
among its general unsecured creditors. Thus, we find provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code, such as
those providing for the recovery
of preferences, 2 designed so that
no unsecured creditor will receive
more than its fair share of the
debtor's assets as against the genIn re Spectra Prism Industries,
eral creditor body.
Inc.
This principle of equitable disThe question presented in
tribution has been firmly estabSpectra
was whether a trustee in
lished insofar as unsecured credibankruptcy, as a judicial lien creditor by virtue of Section 5444 of
the Bankruptcy Code, had stand* Counsel to the law finn of Levin & ing to block the issuance of an
Weintraub & Crames, New York City; order requiring a senior lienholder
member of the National Bankruptcy Con- to marshal its collateral so as to
ference.
** ProfessorofLaw, Hofstra University maximize recovery by a junior
School of Law, Hempstead, New York; lienor.
associated with the law firm of Moritt,
The debtors had three types of
Wolfeld & Resnick, Garden City, New
collateral
with which to satisfy the
York; associate member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
1 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
348 u.s. 913 (1954).
2 11 u.s.c. § 547.

3 28 Bankr. 397 (9th Cir. App. Panel
1983).
4
11 u.s.c. § 544.
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claims of creditors, namely,
equipment, inventory, and accounts receivable. Heidelberg
West, Inc. (Heidelberg) held the
senior lien on the debtor's equipment to secure a debt of$132,750.
The National Acceptance Co. of
California (NACC) held a blanket
lien against all assets, but junior to
the Heidelberg lien against the
equipment. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (Wells Fargo) had a security
interest only on the equipment
that was junior to both the other
liens. The trustee claimed to have
a blanket lien as a judicial lien
creditor under Section 544(a) of
the Code. A chart of the secured
claims and the trustee's position
follows:
Equipment

Inventory

Heidelberg NACC
(Trustee)
(3) Wells Fargo
(4) (Trustee)
(1)

(2) NACC

The Principle of Marshaling
The effect of this order was to
eliminate the NACC's participation in the proceeds of the equipment, but this did not affect payment of the N ACC' s claim, which
it could satisfy out of the proceeds
of the inventory and the receivables. The result would be that all
secured creditors would be paid,
but nothing left to the trustee as
the representative of the unsecured creditors.
The court enunciated the principle of marshaling of assets that
had been relied upon by Wells
Fargo:
"Marshaling is an equitable doctrine developed historically and
traditionally used to prevent a
junior lienholder with a security
interest in a single property from
being' squeezed out by a senior
lienholder with a security interest
not only in that property, but in
one or more additional properties.
The doctrine requires the senior
lienholder to first resort to assets
free of the junior lien to avoid the
inequity which would otherwise result from the unnecessary elimination of the junior lienholder's security with the increased likelihood
the junior creditor will be unable to
satisfy its claim." 5

Accounts
Receivable
NACC
(Trustee)

Pursuant to court order, the
debtor's equipment was sold at a
trustee's sale and the Heidelberg
lien was extinguished with a portion of the proceeds. The remainder was to be applied to the junior
lienors. Since the lien of the
NACC exceeded the remainder,
Wells Fargo sought and obtained
an ''Order to Compel Marshaling
of Assets and to Determine Priority Rights in Property of the Estate." This order was granted by
the bankruptcy court and the
trustee appealed it to the bankruptcy appellate panel.

For marshaling to be imposed
by a junior lienholder, there are
four basic requirements to be met:
s1n re Spectra Prism Indus., Inc., 28
Bankr. 397, 398-399 (9th Cir. App. Panel
1983) (quoting Shedoudy v. Beverly Surgical Supply Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 730,
733, 161 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1980)).
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(1) there must be two or more

funds; (2) only one creditor may
have the right to resort to both
funds; (3) there must be an absence of prejudice to the senior
lienholder; and (4) the imposition
of marshaling must avoid injustice
to third persons.
The sole element at issue was
the fourth requirement. The trustee asserted that in his capacity as a hypothetical judicial lien
creditor under Section 544(a)(l),
he is prejudiced because assets
·'potentially belonging to the estate, are lost as a result of the
marshaling order. " 6 A majority of
the appellate panel agreed that
under Section 544(a), the trustee
is granted all "rights and powers
that a creditor holding a judicial
lien would have had after prevailing in a simple contract action,
whether or not such creditor
exists in fact.' ' 7 In other words,
since "the trustee is given status
under§ 544(a)(l) to act as ajudicial lien creditor, he obtains the
right and power to protect the assets of the estate to the same degree that any judicial lien creditor
would be able to. " 8
Notwithstanding its own circuit's decision in Forester v. Steward9 denying a request for a
marshaling order by a trustee in
bankruptcy, the appellate panel
focused on the decision of a California appellate court in Shedoudy
6

In re Spectra, 28 Bankr. at 399.
Id.
8 Id.
9
529 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1976).
7
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v. Beverly Surgical Supply Co., 10
which stands for the proposition
that a judgment creditor under
state law is a junior claimant entitled to a marshaling order. The
"validity, nature, and effect of
liens are governed by the law of
the state where the property is
situated." 11 Shedoudy recognizes
that "such a [judgment] creditor
could indeed be prejudiced" by a
marshaling order and ·'that creditor should, therefore, be permitted to block such a motion. "12
The majority in Spectra reasoned
that the trustee under Section
544(a) has the same right to block
a marshaling order as enjoyed by
a judgment creditor under California law. Accordingly, the marshaling order of the bankruptcy court
was vacated. In essence, the appellate panel's holding eliminates
the use of the marshaling doctrine
in bankruptcy cases because general unsecured creditors that
naturally are affected by marshaling may, through the trustee as a
judicial lien creditor, block such
an order.
The Dissent

The dissenting judge noted that
''if the parties were not involved
with bankruptcy, there is no question that marshaling would be
properly granted over objections
by general unsecured credi10 100 Cal. App. 3d 730, 161 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1980).
11 In re Spectra, 28 Bankr. at 399.
12
ld. at 400.
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tors." 13 Therefore, the essential
issue is ''whether the fictional
status of a judgment creditor
granted to the trustee" under Section 544 ·'was intended to be used
in a marshaling context for the
purpose of displacing a validly secured creditor in order to provide
general unsecured creditors access to assets which otherwise
would be unavailable to them." ' 4
The dissent did not dispute that
the language of Section 544, as
well as the language of Section
70(c) of the former Bankruptcy
Act, endows the trustee with a
judgment lien. "[C]ases under
these sections rarely, if ever,
hinge on the lien as an intrinsic
property right of the trustee. The
great number of decisions dealing
with these sections have tested
the validity or viability of transfers or claims on the debtor's
property against the abstract
standard of the hypothetical
judgment creditor as if the trustee
were of this character." 15 The
purpose of the section was to effectuate the "defeasance of secret, undisclosed, or unperfected
claims so as to bring about equality of distribution among creditors." 16 In the instant case, as far
as Wells Fargo was concerned, it
did not have an undisclosed or
imperfect claim that was defeasible by a judgment creditor, but
had a valid, perfected claim. "In-

vocation of § 544 is .therefor-e inappropriate.'' 17
The dissent noted that Lewis v.
Manufacturer's Bank ofDetroit, 'ls
decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court under former Section 7.0(c),
was pertinent. There the secured
creditor filed its chattel mortgage
five months before bankruptcy
but four days after execution of
the mortgage instead of immediately as required by Michigan law
at the time. The trustee attempted
to avoid the mortgage becaus(!
during the period between exe~u
tion and perfection the trustee as a
hypothetical lien creditor under
former Section 70(c) could have
senior lien rights. The Sppreme
Court, however, held tha~ to grant
the trustee such relief ''would
give the trustee power to set aside
transactions · which no creditor
could void and which injured no
creditor. That construction would
enrich unsecured creditors at the
expense of secured creditors,
creating a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy." 19
The dissent reasoned that Section 544(a) was not intended to
prevent marshaling in bankruptcy
cases despite the literal reading
of that section. It also disagreed
with the majority's reliance on
Shedoudy that deals with California state law. "It does not inter-

13Jd.
14 Id.
15

11Jd.
18 364

ld. (emphasis added).

16Jd.

19
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pret nor affect application of section 544.' •2o
Conclusion

The decision in Spectra is similar to the error of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Constance v. Harvey, 21 as well as
the subsequent case of Conti v.
Volper. 22 Taking a literal approach to the application of
former Section 70(c), the court of
appeals in Constance gave a
trustee the power to avoid a validly perfected security interest by
reaching back in prebankruptcy
time to fictionalize the extension
of credit prior to perfection of the
lien. In essence, the court allowed
the avoidance of a lien that no
creditor could have avoided in the
absence of bankruptcy. Constance was overruled by Lewis.
Indeed, Justice Harlan, who
20

In re Spectra, 28 Bankr. at 401.
215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
348 u.s. 913 (1954).
'
22 132 F. Supp. 205, affd, 229 F.2d 317
(2d Cir. 1956); see Weintraub Levin &
Beldock, "The Strong-Arm Cla~se Strikes
the Belated Chattel Mortgage," 25 Fordham L. Rev. 261 (1956) for the history of
§ 70c, the predecessor of§ 544.
21
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wrote the opinion in Constance as
a circuit judge, was a justice of the
Supreme Court when the court
considered the Lewis case. In
concurring in the court's decision
he candidly admitted to error:
think it is appropriate to say that I
have long since come to the view
that the second opinion in Constance, 214 F.2d 575, was illcon.sidered. I welcome this opportumty to join in setting the matter
right. "23
The reasoning of Lewis should
have been dispositive of the Spectra case. On the date of the filing of the petition, Wells Fargo
had a valid lien that could not be
attacked by the trustee. Had
Wells Fargo not perfected its lien
.
'
1t would be vulnerable to attack
by the trustee, who would then
have preserved it for the benefit of
the estate. It is doubtful that Congress intended to eliminate the
doctrine of marshaling of assets in
bankruptcy cases when it enacted
the Code. For this reason, the dissenting opinion in Spectra presents the sounder view.
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Lewis, 364 U.S. at 610.

